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Recent Developments

Holbrook v. State:
Arson and Reckless Endangerment Do Not Have to be Merged at Sentencing
Because They are Considered Separate Crimes
By Toni Boettcher
In a case of first impression, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland held
reckless endangerment and arson are
separate crimes for double jeopardy
purposes and, therefore, do not have
to be merged at sentencing. Holbrook
v. State, 364 Md. 354, 772A.2d 1240
(2001). The court further held
Legislative intent was c1ear1hatpersons
convicted of arson might also be
convicted ofreckless endangerment.
Holbrook, the defendant, lived wi1h
his girlfiiend and several ofher family
members at the residence that is the
subject of this case. Following a
physical altercation wi1h his girlfiiend,
Holbrook was told to leave the home
and not return. Holbrook returned to
the home several times. When his
girlfriend refused to talk to him, he
1hreatenedto "get all of1hem" orto "bwn
the house down." On the day of the
fire, Holbrook wentto the home to talk
to his girlfriend. After being told she
was not home, Holbrook loitered
outside the residence for about 45
minutes. Later that night, the house was
set on fire. Holbrook was seen across
the street from the home about ten
minutes after 1he fire was discovered.
The eight people inside the house
escaped wi1hout injury.
Holbrook was tried in a bench
trial in the Circuit Court for Wicomico
County and was found guilty of one
count of first-degree arson and eight
counts of reckless endangennent. At

sentencing, Holbrook received thirty
years for1he arson conviction, ofwhich
seven and one-half years were
suspended. He was sentenced to five
years forthe first reckless endangennent
conviction, to run consecutive with the
arson sentence. Holbrook received five
years for each of the seven remaining
reckless endangennent convictions, to
run consecutive to the arson sentence,
but concurrent to the first reckless
endangerment sentence and to each
other. The Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland affirmed the trial court, and
the Court of Appeals of Maryland
granted certiorari and affinned.
In reaching its decision, the
court ofappeals first examined legislative
history to determine the Legislature's
intent when drafting the reckless
endangerment statute. Id. at 362,772
A.2d 1246. The court found the statute
was constructed for the purpose of
"deterringtheconunissionofpotentially
harmful conduct before an injury or
death occurs." Id. at 366, 772 A.2d
1247(citingStatev. Pagotto, 361 Md.
528, 762 A.2d 97 (2000)). Because
the intent ofthe statute was to prevent
the commission of potentially hannful
conduct, a defendant could be found
guilty even ifno actual injury occurred.
Id. The court determined it did not
matter whether the accused intended his
conductto create a substantial risk of
injury or death. Id. at 367,772 A.2d
1247. Reckless endangerment can be

found if the act would have been seen
as a gross departure from the standard
of conduct that a law-abiding person
would observe. Id. (citing Minor v.
State, 326 Md. 436, 605 A.2d 138
(1992)).
Next, the court examined the history
of arson. [d. at 367, 772A.2d 1248.
The statute evolved from the common
law, which defined arson as the
"malicious burning ofthe dwelling of
another." [d. (citing Brown v. State,
285 Md. 469, 403 A.2d 788 (1968)).
Today, the statute defines arson as
''wi11ful1y or maliciously setting fire to or
burning a dwelling or occupied
structure, whether the property ofthe
person or another." Id. (citing Md.
Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.),Art. 27,
§ 6(a)). "Willfully" is defined as an act
that is done intentionally, knowingly,
and purposefully. [d. at 369, 772A.2d
1248. "Maliciously" is defined as an
act done with the intent to harm a
person or property. Id. To consider a
structure a "dwelling," it must be setup
forovemightaccommodations, although
it is not necessary that the building
actually be occupied at the time ofthe
arson. [d.
The court then looked at the
required evidence test, which
determines for double jeopardy
pwposes whether the ctifferentoifenses,
growing out of the same occurrence,
should be merged and treated as the
same offense. Id. at 370, 772 A.2d
32.1 U. Bait. L.F. 43
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1249. Under this test, if each offense
contains at least one elementnecessaty
to secure a conviction that the other
does not, the offenses are not
considered the same and merger need
not occur to prevent double jeopardy.
ld. (citing Williams v. State, 323 Md.
312,593 A.2d 671 (1991)).
In the instant case, arson and
reckless endangerment each have one
differing element; arson requires a
defendant to act "willfully and
"maliciously," while reckless
endangerment requires a defendant to
act "recklessly." TIlerefore, the two
offenses do not merge. Id. at371, 772
A.2d 1249. In discussing the difference
between the elements of arson and
reckless endangerment, the court
reasoned the Legislature was clear in its
definition of"malicious" and "willful" in
the arson statute and it intended arson
to be a specific intent crime. !d. at371,
772 A.2d 1250. On the other hand, in
view of the fact that reckless
endangennent requires a person to
consciously disregard any risk ofharm
to other people, the Legislature intended
reckless endangerment to be a general
intent clime. Id. Furthemlore, arson is
a crime against habitation, whereas
reckless endangemlent is a crime against
people. ld. at 372, 772 A.2d 1250.
As Holbrook was convicted and
sentenced on two separate crimes, the
court detennined there was no double
jeopardy violation. Id. 373, 772A.2d
1251.
Finally, the court considered the rule
oflenity, which requires that when there
is doubt or ambiguity as to the legislative
intent regarding multiple punishments for
the same act, the conflict will be resolved
against ''turning a single transaction into

32.1 U. BaIt L.F. 44

multiple offenses." Id. (citing
Williams v. State, 323 Md. 312, 593
A.2d 671 (1991)). The purpose of
this rule is to prevent courts from
increasing the statutoty penalty when
it is not certain how much punishment
the Legislature intended. Id. Thecourt
determined the Legislature worded
the reckless endangerment statute to
remove the ambiguity. Id. at 374,
772A.2d 1251.
In Holbrook v. State, the Court
ofAppeals ofMatyland held reckless
endangerment and arson do not have
to be merged for sentencing
purposes because they are separate
crimes. In the past, the general intent
of reckless disregard for
consequences was substituted for the
specific intentrequiredto establish the
mens rea element of arson. This is
no longer the case. This ruling makes
clear the importance ofthe protection
of human life in our society. It also
attempts to deter potentially harmful
conduct by allowing for separate
punishments for a single act, even if
there are no injuries.
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